SUMMARY Image authentication is applied to protect the integrity of the digital image. Conventional image authentication mechanisms, however, are unfit for the palette-based color images. Palette-based color images such as GIF images are commonly used for media communications. This article proposes a palette-based color image authentication mechanism. This novel scheme can guarantee the essentials of general authentication schemes to protect palette-based color images. Morphological operations are adopted to draw out the tampered area precisely. According to the experimental results, the images embedded with the authentication data still can preserve high image quality; specifically, the new scheme is highly sensitive to altered areas.
Introduction
Due to the rapid advancement of computer technology, most media are now digitized. Traditional photographs can be quickly transformed into digital images using a scanner. Since digital images are represented by a sequence of bits, it is easy to modify digital images by changing the bit values. Hence, protecting the content of digital images is an urgent issue. Until now, engineers have proposed many image watermarking techniques for solving these problems. For different purposes, they have branched into two classifications: robust image watermarking techniques [1] [14] , [16] .
Robust image watermarking techniques are used to protect ownership of the digital image. These techniques embed an ownership watermark into the digital image. If an intruder tampers with the watermarked image or announces ownership of the tampered image, the watermark can be extracted from the tampered image. Ownership can be verifi ed by revealing the extracted watermark. Thus, this type of classification focuses on how the watermarking system can preserve the robustness of the image.
In contrast, the purpose of fragile image watermarking techniques is image authentication, that is, to ensure the integrity of the digital image. Whether or not the digital image has been modified is a more considerable point. A fragile image watermarking system must be able to sense tampering of the digital image as well as the area that has been tampered.
Fragile image watermarking techniques can be further divided into digital signature approaches [8] , [10] , [11] , [14] and watermark-based approaches [2] , [9] , [16] . The main difference lies in whether the authentication data have been embedded into digital media. For digital signature approaches, a set of features is extracted from the digital image as the authentication data. Authentication data are kept as the independent message and can be used to verify a tampered image. Due to its independent property, the authentication data are not modified if the original image is tampered. This type of image authentication mechanism is expected to resist malicious modifications and tolerate modifications caused by image-processing incidents such as JPEG compression or blurring.
The watermark-based approaches also extract a set of features as the authentication data from the digital image and then embed the data into the image. After embedding, the digital image is referred to as an authenticated image. For content authentication, authentication data must be extracted from the tampered image. If parts of the authentication data are lost, the extracted authentication data are used to point out the modified areas. This type of image authentication scheme is used to extract authentication data and to point out the tampered areas after the content of the digital image is modified.
Fragile image watermarking techniques, however, do not fit palette-based color image compression. Palette-based color images such as GIF images are often used for media communications. Tzeng and Tsai [18] propose an authentication method to protect palette images using fragile watermarks and digital signatures. Their method classifies each pixel as embeddable or non-embeddable.
The authentication data are embedded into embeddable pixels using a mapping function to obtain an authenticated image. For nonembeddable pixels, an exclusive-OR operation is applied to the authentication data and to the non-embeddable pixels in order to generate an extra digital signature. Their method offers high quality embedded images and protects the integrity of palette images. In addition, this method can efficiently locate the altered area in the authenticated image while it is being tampered. When there are fewer embeddable pixels than non-embeddable pixels, the payload of embeddable authentication data may be reduced, and the size of the digital signature may increase.
To mitigate these potential problems, this article proposes a novel palette-based color image authentication mechanism. The new scheme consists of two components: a VQ-based spreading technique that can be used to protect the integrity of digital images and morphological operations applied to connect the modified points in order to contour the tampered areas. Comparing of Tzeng and Tsai's method [18] , the major advantages of the new scheme are: 1) all pixels are embeddable, thus it needs not to generate the digital signature for the authentication of the protected palette image; 2) it can highlight the tampered areas in the authenticated image by using the morphological operations. Our experimental results demonstrate that the proposed scheme preserves high standards and offers quality protection for palette-based color images.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. To begin with, we review the VQ-based spreading technique in Sect. 2. Then, we present our method in Sect. 3. In Sect. 4, we offer our experimental results to demonstrate the effectiveness of our new method. Finally, we make conclusions in Sect. 5.
Related Works
In this section, we briefly introduce the concept of Vector Quantization (VQ) [3] . Then, we go over the VQ-based spreading technique proposed by Jo and Kim [5].
Vector Quantization
VQ is a technique used to compress digital images. A codebook which consists of a set of codewords plays an important role in VQ technique. Each codeword refers to a corresponding index so that we can use the index to reach the codeword. All codewords come from training several candidate image blocks by the LBG algorithm [7] . In the encoding phase, an original image is divided into non-overlapping blocks with the same size. Therefore, we can find the most similar codewords for a sequence of non-overlapping blocks. By recording the corresponding indices for codewords, the image has been compressed by VQ technique. In the decoding phase, because of holding a sequence of indices, we can reconstruct the image by looking codewords up in the codebook according to those indices. We draw out the flowchart of VQ technique in Fig. 1 .
VQ-Based Spreading Technique
In 2002, Jo and Kim [5] proposed a VQ-based spreading technique and applied it on image watermarks. The VQbased spreading technique divides codewords of a codebook into three groups: G-1, G0, and G1. Each codeword exactly belongs to one of three groups. That we use a codeword belonging to G1 or G0 to encode a block means we embed a bit with value 1 or 0 in the block. Once we use a codeword in G-1, it indicates that we can't embed any bit in this block. The flowchart of the VQ method.
For each input block, if its closest codeword doesn't belong to G-1, then there must exist some similar codewords either in G1 or G0. Therefore, we can pick out a similar codeword from G1 or G0 according to the embedded value 1 or 0. We continue to introduce how to divide codewords into three groups [5] . First of all, we shall decide a threshold T according to experiments. Furthermore, all codewords in the codebook are set to be unprocessed ones. We then randomly select a codeword cwi from unprocessed codewords. For cwi, we find two closest codewords cwj and cw'j from the codebook. Here, we use the symbol D(cwx, cwy) to represent the Euclidean distance between two codewords cwx and cwy.
In the second step, we have to calculate the distance values of D(cwi, cwj) and D(cwi, cw'j), respectively. According to the distance values and threshold T, there exist some different cases. The first case is that both of D(cwi, cwj) and D(cwi, cw'j) are less than T. In this case, we randomly pick up cwj or cw'j to form a pair referred to cwi. Assume that the chosen codeword is cwj. Then we can get a codeword pair (cwi, cwj). The second case is that only one distance value is less than T. If D(cwi, cw'j) < T, we can obtain a codeword pair (cwi, cw'j). In case that both two distance values are larger than T, the codeword cwi is assigned to G-1.
In the third step, for each codeword pair (cwi, cwj) or (cwi, cw'j), we randomly assign cwi to G1 or G0. The other codeword cwj or cw'j is assigned to the opposite group. After going through three steps, all codewords in the codebook are divided into three groups. We subsequently introduce the watermark embedded procedure. For each input block, we have to find the nearest codeword from the codebook. If the selected codeword belongs to G0 (or G1) and the bit value of watermark is also 0 (or 1), then we take the index of the selected codeword as an output. If the found codeword belongs to G0 (or G1) but the bit value of watermark is 1 (or 0), then we have to fi nd a nearest codeword from the opposite group and take the index of found codeword as an output. In case that the found codeword belongs to G-1, then we take the index of the found codeword as an output. After going through the watermark embedded procedure, the watermark has been embedded into VQ indices.
Note that groups {G-1, G0, G1} must be kept secret for security reason.
The Proposed Scheme
This section describes the proposed method and the VQbased spreading technique. Since VQ-based grayscale image compression and palette-based color image compression are similar, it is easy to utilize this technique [5] for palettebased color image compression.
The new scheme consists of an authenticating procedure and a detecting procedure. The first procedure embeds the authentication data into palette-based color image using the VQ-based spreading technique, while the second procedure explains how authorized users verify the tampered color image. The details of these two procedures are presented in the following sections.
Authenticating Procedure
The authenticating procedure (Fig. 2) consists of three phases: palette partition, which divides the palette colors into two groups; authentication data generation, which produces a sequence of bits as the authentication data; and authentication embedding, which embeds the authentication data into the color indices.
Palette partition phase
In the first phase, we divide all the colors in the palette into two groups: G0 and G1. The partition algorithm is described as follows.
Step 1: Mark all colors in the palette as unprocessed colors.
Step 2: Select one color ci from unprocessed colors randomly and mark ci as a processed color.
Step 3: Find the closest color to ci from unprocessed colors. Assume that cj is the closest one. Then, mark cj as a processed color.
Step 4: Assign ci to G1 (or G0) randomly and assign cj to the opposite group. Fig. 2 The flowchart of the embedding procedure.
Step Step 1: Select a seed SK as the secret key.
Step Step 1: Set the symbol i equal to 0 and the symbol N equal to the image size.
Step 2: Input a color pixel xi, where 0•…i•…N, from a color image.
Step 3: Input a secret bit si from the authentication data S.
Step 4: Check the value of si. If si=0, find the closest color to xi from G0; otherwise, find the closest color to xi from G1. Take the found index as the output.
Step 
Detecting Procedure
An authorized user is allowed to validate the embedded authentication data and to indicate which areas have been modified. We divide the detecting procedure into two parts: authentication extraction and tampering location. First, we extract the authentication data from the tampered palette-based color image. Since the tampered color pixel may fall into the group to which the authenticated pixel belongs, some modified color pixels may be judged as non-modified. Fig. 3 ).
Step 1: Set symbol i equal to 0 and symbol N equal to the size of an indexed image.
Step 2: Input an color index xi from a tampered image, where 0 •… i •… N.
Step 3: Check the group that xi belongs to. If xi belongs to G0, then output one bit with value 0; otherwise, output one bit with value 1.
Step 4: Check the value of i. If i •‚ N, set i = i + 1 and go to
Step 2.
After the extracting procedure, we can extract the authentication data S' from the tampered image.
Tampering Location
Subsequently, we describe how to locate the modified area.
We first produce an original authentication data S by feeding S K into the PRNG. Using S and S', we can detect the Fig. 3 The flowchart of the extracting procedure. modified area by locating the difference location panel P as follows:
where (+) is an exclusive-OR operator and P indicates the tampered area (see Fig. 4 ). We use the difference location panel in Fig. 4 Fig. 9 (a) ). alteration. The results show that the proposed scheme can precisely locate the two intruded planes. We use another test image to demonstrate the ability of the new scheme to detect tampering. Figure 10 (a) presents the tampered image. We alter the complex area (hair) and the smooth area (shoulder) of the authentication image. The white pixels in Fig. 10 (b) demonstrate the detected result ( Fig. 10 (a) ). The new scheme is capable of detecting the tampered region in both the smooth and complex areas. In the next experiment, we illustrate the sensitivity of the novel scheme. After ranging out areas of the authenticated image, Gaussian blurring is used to blur the selected range. To show the superiority of our method, we select a complex image, Pepper, as the test image. For the authenticated image, we blur the text areas to obtain the tampered image ( Fig. 11 (a) ). From the results, we cannot observe any alteration in the tampered image, although it is indeed modified.
Figure 11 (b) shows the final result after detecting the modified pixels, indicated in white. The new scheme is able to verify any slight alteration in both the smooth area and the edge area. Figure 11 (c) shows the advantage of the novel scheme with the morphological operations. According to the marked white pixels, our scheme can precisely locate the blurred areas.
For a smooth test image, Tiffany, we blur text areas to obtain the tampered image ( Fig. 12 (a) ). The tampered areas are slight and imperceptive. The white pixels in Fig. 12 (b) indicate the tampered results from the detecting procedure. Figure 12 (c) presents the emphatic resultant adapting morphological operations. This demonstrates that the new scheme is capable of detecting slight and insignificant alterations in both smooth and complex images. Due to the high sensibility of the proposed scheme, we can hide the message by ranging out the text areas and blurring them. To extract the hiding message, the receiver only needs to proceed through the detecting procedure.
According to Figs new scheme can effectively detect the altered regions of tampered images. Considering the worst case, the density of white pixels may be low after the detecting procedure. To enhancing this, we extend the window size of the morphological operations to cover the tampered pixels sensitively; this allows the tampered regions to be highlighted more eas- 
